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Abstract— We formulate two versions of the power con-
trol problem for wireless networks with latency constraints
arising from duty cycle allocations In the first version,
strategic power optimization, wireless nodes are modeled as
rational agents in a power game, who strategically adjust
their powers to minimize their own energy. In the other
version, joint power optimization, wireless nodes jointly
minimize the aggregate energy expenditure. Our analysis
of these models yields insights into the different energy
outcomes of strategic versus joint power optimization. We
derive analytical solutions for power allocation under both
models and study how they are affected by data loads and
channel quality. We derive simple necessary conditions for
the existence of Nash equilibria in the power game and also
provide numerical examples of optimal power allocation
under both models. Finally, we show that joint optimization
can (sometimes) be Pareto-optimal and dominate strategic
optimization, i.e the energy expenditure of all nodes is lower
than if they were using strategic optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Energy-efficiency is a critical concern in many wire-
less networks, such as cellular networks, ad-hoc net-
works or wireless sensor networks (WSNs) that consist
of large number of sensor nodes equipped with unre-
plenishable and limited power resources. Since wireless
communication accounts for a significant portion of node
energy consumption, network lifetime and utility are
dependent on the design of energy-efficient communica-
tion schemes including low-power signalling and energy-
efficient multiple access protocols.
There has been a significant amount of research on
transmission power control for wireless networks. Sev-
eral approaches for maximizing information transmis-
sion over a shared channel subject to average power
constraints have been proposed [1], [2], [3], [4], [5],
[6]. [7] addresses the issue of minimizing transmission
power, subject to a given amount of information being
successfully transmitted and derives power control mul-
tiple access (PCMA) algorithms for autonomous channel
access. [4] describes an aggregate power control scheme
for a group of interfering users subject to minimal
signal-to-noise (SNR) constraints. They also show that
this power vector solution is Pareto-optimal since each
individual nodes power is also minimized by this vector.
In other words, the strategic or node-centric solution
coincides with the aggregate or network-centric solution.
[2], [3] then propose joint scheduling and power-control
algorithms for wireless networks based on this system
model. However, the above results do not explicitly
account for differential delay constraints on individual
nodes. In this paper, we investigate the relationship
between strategic energy minimization and aggregate
energy minimization when distinct delay constraints are
imposed on individual nodes. Our results show that the
two solutions do not always coincide (as in [4]). More
surprisingly, there are certain conditions under which
aggregate energy minimization is still Pareto-optimal i.e
outperforms strategic behavior.
Delay is an important constraint in many wireless
network applications, for example battlefield surveillance
or target tracking in which data with finite lifetime-
information must be delivered before a deadline. When
delay constraints are introduced, the problem of energy
minimization is equivalent to calculating energy-latency
tradeoffs. Minimizing transmission energy subject to
latency constraints has been studied recently [8], [9],
[10]. [10] considers minimum energy scheduling where
the total transmit power is convex in the transmission
rates and a node has to finish transmitting information
over a finite time horizon T . [11], [12] propose online
modulation scaling policies for implementing energy-
latency tradeoffs over a point-to-point link. Delay con-
straints in wireless networks can also be examined in
terms of node operation under periodic duty cycles, in
which time is divided into active (awake) and inactive
(asleep) periods. [13], [14], [15] establish the idea of
duty cycles in WSNs as a practical means of conserving
node energy. In [14], nodes periodically exchange duty
cycle information with each other, thereby enabling the
construction of interleaved duty cycle schedules.
In this paper, we consider the problem of minimizing
transmission energy for a group of users transmitting
information to their receivers over a shared wireless
channel over overlapping intervals or duty cycles as in
the case of wireless sensor networks. Clearly, there are
two approaches to transmission energy minimization. In
the first approach, nodes can adjust their transmission
powers to jointly minimize an aggregate transmission
energy function. While this could result in higher en-
ergy depletion at some nodes1, this approach could be
beneficial in improving network lifetime, especially for
wireless sensor networks containing a large number of
redundant nodes (that can afford to lose energies at
differential rates).
Alternatively, nodes can adjust their transmission pow-
ers strategically in response to the power behaviors of
other nodes, in order to minimize their own energy con-
sumption. A wireless network in which nodes optimize
strategically could increase network utility/performance
since critical nodes, for example, routing hot-spots or
clusterheads/aggregator nodes in sensor networks, might
consume less energy (depending on loads, channel qual-
ity etc.). Another reason to investigate strategic optimiza-
tion is to gauge the energy outcome of selective node
misbehavior. Node misbehavior can occur in insecure
networks if nodes are captured by adversaries and then
do not follow agreed upon transmission policies. A
useful side effect of strategic energy optimization by
all nodes might be to discourage selective misbehavior
by some nodes, since this misbehavior will not lead to
performance gains.
For the problem of energy optimization in a wireless
network, it is not clear apriori (in terms of the existence
of a quantitative formula) whether strategic or joint
energy minimization has a bigger impact on network
utility/lifetime. As seen above, a case can be made
for either approach depending on the specific network
and/or application. Therefore in this paper we formulate
a model for evaluating strategic as well as aggregate
energy minimization in delay-constrained wireless net-
works and compare the energy outcomes of the two
approaches. For the strategic energy minimization ap-
proach, we develop a simple game-theoretic model of a
2-player power game and analytically derive conditions
for the existence of Nash equilibria in this game. We then
derive the power vectors for joint energy minimization
and then investigate the relationship between the energy
outcomes of the two approaches. We find that when duty
cycles partially overlap, there exist channel and load
conditions under which the energy vector for joint energy
minimization is strictly lesser than the energy vector for
strategic energy minimization. This is highly surprising
since strategic energy optimization focuses only on re-
ducing individual energies and should therefore benefit
at least one node.
1
1This is because all nodes are adjusting their powers to minimize
an aggregate function and not their own energies. Note that this does
not occur in the system model of [4] and related work because of the
Pareto-optimality of the power vectors, but could happen in the model
with explicit delay constraints investigated here, as shown later.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In order to gain insight into the problem, we first con-
sider a typical interference channel model consisting of
two transmitter-receiver pairs: NTx1 (node 1) and NTx2
(node 2), transmitting to their respective receivers NRx1
and NRx2 . Each transmitter has its own information to
send to its receiver within its prescribed deadline. The
transmission periods of the two nodes partially overlap.
We assume that node 1 transmits first over the period
T I = T1 + T2, while node 2 starts its transmission
later over the period T II = T2 + T3, T = T1 + T2 +
T3, and T I 6= T II in general. This can happen in
wireless ad-hoc networks where different nodes initiate
periodic transmissions at different times, for example
in wireless sensor networks, nodes operate under duty
cycles over an interval T which is divided into active
(awake) and inactive (asleep) periods. [14], [13]. We
represent the average transmission load on each node
by R1 = B1/T and R2 = B2/T , where B1 and B2,
respectively, represent the total amount of information
to be transmitted by each node within its deadline. We
use the notation µ1 and µ2 to represent the active ratios
of the two nodes respectively, i.e. µ1 = (|T1 + T2|/|T |)
and µ2 = (|T2 + T3|)/|T |.
Let α(i,j), i, j ∈ {1, 2} be the channel attenuation
factors between NTxi and NRxj , which captures the ef-
fects of path-loss, shadowing and frequency nonselective
fading. Our analysis focuses on the case of a slowly
fading channel where the delay constraints are on the
order of channel coherence time, i.e these parameters
remain fixed over the active periods. It is also assumed
that these channels experience independent fading. This
two-user interference channel system can therefore be
modeled as
r11(t) = α
(11)s11(t) + n11(t), t ∈ T1
r12(t) = α
(11)s12(t) + α
(21)s22(t) + n12(t), t ∈ T2
r22(t) = α
(12)s12(t) + α
(22s22(t) + n22(t), t ∈ T2
r23(t) = α
(22)s23(t) + n23(t), t ∈ T3 (1)
where rij(t) are the received baseband signals at node
NRxi in the jth interval, sij(t) are the transmit narrow-
band signals from node NTxi over jth interval with
power E
[
|sij |
2(t)
]
= Pij , and nij(t) are the additive
complex white Gaussian noise with power ηi. It is
assumed transmitters and receivers have full access to
channel state information (CSI) such that channel coding
over two independent blocks by each transmit node
enables error free transmissions over two periods. Single
user decoding is assumed at each receiver NRxi to
decode the information from its own transmit node NTxi
while treating other party’s information as Gaussian in-
terference. The normalized mutual information between
NTxi and NRxi over the active periods are
R1 = (1− µ2)R11 + (µ1 + µ2 − 1)R12
R2 = (1− µ1)R23 + (µ1 + µ2 − 1)R22 (2)
where Rij = log2 (1 + ρij) is the rate of node i in the
jth interval with signal-to-interference-noise-ratio (SNR)
defined as follows:
ρ12 =
G(11)P12
G(21)P22 + η1
, ρ22 =
G(22)P22
G(12)P12 + η2
ρ11 =
G(11)P11
η1
, ρ23 =
G(22)P23
η2
(3)
where G(ij) = |α(ij)|2.
III. PROBLEM SETUP
We consider the problem of minimizing node trans-
mission energies by using the system model defined
above to formulate two approaches and analytically
evaluate their differences: (a) strategic delay-constrained
energy optimization and (b) delay-constrained aggregate
energy optimization. We develop the models for the two
transmitter-receiver case and analytically evaluate the
differences between the two approaches.
We first model the problem of delay constrained
energy minimization as a simple two player power
game with the following parameters: Node 1 selects its
transmit power during periods T1 and T2 from the space
P of achievable transmit powers. Thus the strategy choice
of node 1 is represented by l1 = (P11, P12) ∈ P × P.
Likewise, the strategy choice of node 2 is given by
l2 = (P22, P23) ∈ P × P. We consider only pure
strategies here as opposed to the more general mixed
strategy model where nodes choose their Pij ’s from
a probability distribution. For notational simplicity, we
define P13 = P23 = 0 since the nodes are not active
during these time intervals.
Let E1 and E2 denote the transmission energy func-
tions
E1 = T [P11(1− µ2) + P12(µ2 + µ1 − 1)]
E2 = T [P23(1− µ1) + P22(µ2 + µ1 − 1)] (4)
Let Rij represent the transmission rate of node i during
period Tj as defined by Equation 3. Also, R1 = B1/T
and R2 = B2/T represent the average transmission rates
for node 1 and node 2. Then nodes 1 and 2 operate under
load constraints L1 and L2 defined as
L1 = R11(1 − µ2) +R12(µ2 + µ1 − 1)− R¯1 = 0
L2 = R23(1 − µ1) +R22(µ2 + µ1 − 1)− R¯2 = 0(5)
Let l = (li, l−i) represent a particular strategy profile
of the power game. In this case, l−1 = l2, l−2 = l1 and l
also represents a particular energy outcome of the game.
We define the payoff at node i under strategy profile l
as:
Πi(l) = −Ei
Strategy li is defined to be the best-response of player
i to a given l−i if
Πi(l
′
i, l−i) ≤ Πi(li, l−i) for all strategies l′i.
Let BRi(l−i) denote the set of player i’s best response
to l−i. A strategy profile l = (l1, l2) is optimal if
the nodes are playing a Nash Equilibrium[16] i.e. li ∈
BRi(l−i) for each sensor node i.
Note that the best-response power strategy of node
1 minimizes its individual energy consumption and
satisfies its load constraint for a given power strategy
employed by node 2, without accounting for the load
constraint of the other node. However at the Nash equi-
librium point, node 2 is also playing its best repones to
node 1, i.e. both users are simultaneously satisfying their
load constraints as well as minimizing their individual
energies for each others power vector solutions. We will
shortly identify system conditions (for example, load and
channel quality) under which the two players arrive at
Nash equilibrium in the power game, as well as the
existence of Pareto-optimal (efficient) equilibria.
We also consider the joint minimization approach in
which nodes jointly adjust their powers during overlap-
ping periods in order to minimize the aggregate energy
, i.e. minimize
∑
iEi, subject to the load constraints
Li. Joint minimization is important in itself since there
are circumstances under it is preferable from the appli-
cation point of view, for example data aggregation in
sensor networks with large number of redundant nodes.
More importantly, while strategic energy optimization
naturally suggests energy benefits to some nodes, we in-
vestigate whether there are conditions under which joint
energy minimization can strictly dominate the strategic
approach, with respect to all individual node energies.
Surprisingly, this is indeed the case as shown below.
IV. ANALYTICAL RESULTS: STRATEGIC VERSUS
JOINT ENERGY MINIMIZATION
We first obtain optimal strategic power vectors fol-
lowed by power vectors for joint energy minimization.
Optimal strategic power vectors correspond to the Nash
equilibrium points of the two player power game defined
above. Generally games can have several Nash equilibria
or none at all [16], depending on specific conditions (in
this case channel quality and load). We analyze these
possibilities and the implications below.
Let power vectors P ∗1 = (P ∗11, P ∗12) and P ∗2 =
(P ∗23, P
∗
22) represent node 1 and node 2’s best-responses
to each other in the two player power game, with R∗12 =
log(1+P ∗12/(β1+α1P
∗
22)) and R∗22 = log(1+P ∗22/(β2+
α2P
∗
12)) the corresponding best-response rates, where
β1 = η1/G
(11)
, α1 = G
(21)/G(11), β2 = η2/G
(22)
and α2 = G(12)/G(22). Also let C1 = 2R1/(1−µ2) and
C2 = 2
R2/(1−µ1) be load related terms. Finally, define
n = µ1/(1 − µ2), m = µ2/(1 − µ1), 0 < µ1, µ2 < 1,
x = 2R
∗
12 and y = 2R∗22 . Then we have,
Proposition 1: The Nash equilibria of the two player
power game are determined by the solutions to
the system of bivariate functions {F(R∗12, R∗22) =
0,G(R∗12, R
∗
22) = 0} defined by
F : β1x
nym + α1β2C2x
ny
−α1β2C2x
n − β1C1y
m = 0
G : β2x
nym − β2C2x
n
+α2β1C1xy
m − α2β1C1y
m = 0
where x ≥ 1, y ≥ 1.
Proof: For a given P22, the best-responses
(P˜11, P˜12) of node 1 are the solutions to the constrained
minimization problem
Min E1 s.t L1 = 0
By the theory of Lagrange multipliers [17], this can be
obtained by considering the function H1(λ1, P11, P12) =
E1 − λ1L1, where λ1 is a constant. The necessary
condition for the local minimum of E1 satisfies
▽λ1,P˜11,P˜12H1 = 0 (6)
Solving Eq. 6 leads to
λ1
ln 2
= P˜11 + β1 (7)
λ1
ln 2
= P˜12 + β1 + α1P22 (8)
λ1
ln 2
=
β1C1
x˜n−1
(9)
where x˜ = 1 + P˜12β1+α1P22 . Similarly, the best-responses
(P˜23, P˜22) of node 2 for a given P12 can be obtained
from H2(λ2, P23, P22) = E2 − λ2L2 in an identical
manner as:
λ2
ln 2
= P˜23 + β2 (10)
λ1
ln 2
= P˜22 + β2 + α2P12 (11)
λ1
ln 2
=
β2C2
y˜m−1
(12)
(13)
where y˜ = 1 + P˜22β2+α2P12 .
The above equations describe the best-responses of
each node to an arbitrary power value of the other node.
At the Nash equilibrium point, these power values are
not arbitrary and must in fact be best-responses to each
other. Let (P ∗11, P ∗12) and (P ∗23, P ∗22) represent the Nash
power vectors. They can be obtained by solving Eqs.
7-12, where all the power variables are replaced by the
P ∗ij ’s.
Combining Eqs. 8 and 9 and Eqs. 11 and 12, we get
β1 + α1P
∗
22 =
β1C1
xn
(14)
β2 + α2P
∗
12 =
β2C2
ym
(15)
Using the definitions of x and y and simplifying yield
the equilibrium functions as stated.
We now discuss under what conditions equilibria exist
and if so, how many. Meaningful equilibria correspond
to non-negative power allocations P ∗12 ≥ 0 and P ∗22 ≥ 0
are therefore those non negative real-valued solutions
to the equilibrium functions which satisfy 1 ≤ x ≤
2R1/µ1 and 1 ≤ y ≤ 2R2/µ2 . When one of the power
solutions is zero, it corresponds to TDM–Time Division
Multiplexing. We now provide explicit load and channel
quality conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria
for the power game.
Proposition 2: The power game does not have Nash
equilibrium points if exactly one of condition S or
condition T defined below is true. If S and T are both
simultaneously true or false, then there exist at most
three Nash equilibria.
S :
β1
α1
(2
R1
1−µ2 − 1) < β2(2
R2
µ2 − 1)
(n− 1)β2C2A
(n− 1)β2A + α2β1C1
> [1+
(n− 1)β1(C1 −A)
α1 (β2C2A(n− 1) + α2β1C1)
]
m
(16)
T :
β2
α2
(2
R2
1−µ1 − 1) < β1(2
R1
µ1 − 1)
(m− 1)β1C1B
(m− 1)β1B + α1β2C2
> [1
+
(m − 1)β2(C2 − B)
α2 (β1C1B(m − 1) + α1β2C2)
]
n
(17)
where 0 < µ1, µ2 < 1.
Corollary 1: For given channel quality and load con-
ditions, there always exist duty cycle values under which
the nodes can find meaningful equilibrium.
As seen from Eqs. 16 and 17, for any channel quality and
load, we can always find µ1 and µ2 such that the LSH
of condition S.1 and T.1 exceed their RHS. Therefore,
both S and T can be made false and thus equilibrium
exists.
Next we identify the power vectors for the case when
the two nodes carry out joint energy minimization. Let
RJ12 and RJ22 be the rate solutions during the overlapping
period and denote x = 2RJ12 and y = 2RJ22 . The
corresponding power solutions are denoted by P J. .
Proposition 3: The optimal power vectors for joint
energy minimization are determined by the solutions
(x, y) to
P : β1 [1 + α1(x− 1)] [C1 (1− α1α2(x− 1)(y − 1))−
xn (1 + α2(y − 1))] y
m
= α1β2C2 (1− α1α2(x− 1)(y − 1)) [1 + α2(y − 1)] (y − 1)x
n
Q : β2 [1 + α2(y − 1)] [C2 (1− α1α2(x− 1)(y − 1))−
ym (1 + α1(x− 1))]x
n
= α2β1C1 (1− α1α2(x− 1)(y − 1)) [1 + α1(x− 1)] (x− 1)y
m
with P J11 = β1C1/xn−1 and P J23 = β2C2/ym−1.
Proof: The joint objective function to be minimized
by both nodes is
Min (E1 + E2) s.t {L1 = 0, L2 = 0}
Using Lagrange multiplier theory for constrained
minimization [17], define the new function
D(λ1, λ2, P11, P12, P23, P22) =
∑
iEi − λiLi,
where λi is the Lagrange multiplier, i = 1, 2. The local
minimum of
∑
iEi satisfies
▽λ1,λ2,PJ11,PJ12,PJ23,PJ22D = 0 (18)
Let x = 1+ P J12/(β1 + α1P J22) and y = 1+ P J22/(β2 +
α2P
J
12). Solving Eq. 18 and simplifying leads to
P J11 + β1 =
x
(
β1 + α1P
J
22
)
(1 + α2(y − 1))
1− α1α2(x− 1)(y − 1)
(19)
P J23 + β2 =
y
(
β2 + α2P
J
12
)
(1 + α1(x− 1))
1− α1α2(x− 1)(y − 1)
(20)
P J11 + β1 =
β1C1
x˜n−1
(21)
P J23 + β2 =
β2C2
y˜m−1
(22)
Finally, using
x− 1 =
P J12
β1 + α1P J22
(23)
y − 1 =
P J22
β2 + α2P J12
(24)
and combining we get the results as stated.
In the case of joint energy minimization, the non-
existence of feasible power vectors, (i.e P J12 ≥ 0 and
P J22 ≥ 0) implies that one node is creating significant
interference at the other nodes receiver. In this case,
(since the nodes are cooperating, unlike in the strategic
optimization case) one of the nodes can choose to zero
its power output during the overlapping period.
Proposition 4: There exist load, channel quality and
duty-cycle conditions under which joint energy minimiza-
tion is Pareto-optimal, i.e. the optimal energy cost for
each node under joint energy minimization is lower than
its strategically optimal energy cost.
Due to length constraints, we do not provide a for-
mal proof and instead demonstrate the existence of
such conditions through numerical examples. Figure 1
demonstrates the case when joint energy minimization
is Pareto-optimal for different values of µ.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section contains numerical results for optimal
power allocation given the duty cycle µ = µ1 = µ2
for both the strategic and total energy minimization
approach. It is assumed normalized β1 = β2 = 1 and
T = 1.
Figure 1-3 compare individual energies E1 and E2, as
well as the total energy E1 + E2, under both joint and
strategic energy minimization schemes, respectively. It
has been shown in [4] that joint energy minimization
is Pareto-optimal when overlap is complete, i.e. µ = 1.
Figure 1 demonstrates the case when joint energy mini-
mization is still Pareto-optimal even for partial overlap,
i.e. µ < 1. It can also be seen that the dominance of
the joint minimization scheme over the strategic one
becomes greater as µ increases. All these observations
agree with the Proposition 4
Figure 2-3 reflect converging tendency of these two
schemes in the sense that the difference between individ-
ual energies is decreasing. We could expect as µ → 1,
joint energy minimization will yield the same energy
expenditures as the strategic approach for those cases.
For intermediate µ values, Figure 3 and illustrates the
benefit of the strategic approach in terms of energy gains
by the user having smaller load and higher interference.
Since the goal of the strategic scheme is to minimize
individual energies, node 1 saves his energy at the price
of higher energy consumptions for node 2 compared with
the joint energy minimization scheme.
If the node with higher load has better channel quality
in terms of smaller αj , there exists a crossing point of
µ beyond which the joint minimization scheme becomes
Pareto optimal as shown in Figure 2.
The figures show that both joint as well as strategic
optimization have their advantages. Either scheme can
be preferable depending on the specific parameters of
data loads, channel qualities, and duty cycles.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have formulated two versions of the power control
problem for wireless networks with latency constraints
arising from duty cycle allocations. In the first version,
strategic power optimization, wireless nodes are modeled
as rational agents who strategically adjust their powers
to minimize their own energy. In the other version, joint
power optimization, wireless nodes jointly minimize the
aggregate energy expenditure. Using a simple two node
interference channel model, we obtain insights into how
strategic and joint power allocation for energy minimiza-
tion is affected by data loads and channel quality. We
provide analytical solutions along with numerical exam-
ples for finding strategic equilibria and also derive simple
necessary conditions for the existence of such equilibria.
We show that joint optimization can (sometimes) be
Pareto-optimal and dominate strategic optimization, i.e
the energy expenditure of all nodes is lower than if they
were using strategic optimization.
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and strategic energy minimization scheme.B1/T = 2, B2/T = 1,
α1 = 0.1, α2 = 0.5.
0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
En
er
gy
µ, α1 = 0.5, α2 =0.1, B1/T=2, B2/T=1
Total Energy Minimization and Strategic Energy Minimization
 E1 (Total)
E2 (Total)
E1 +E2 (Total)
E1(Strategic)
E2(Strategic)
E1+E2(Strategic)
Fig. 3. Energy versus active cycle length for joint energy minimization
and strategic energy minimization scheme.B1/T = 2, B2/T = 1,
α1 = 0.1, α2 = 0.5. B1/T = 2, B2/T = 1, α1 = 0.5, α2 = 0.1.
